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ceivable need not be used in business transacted outside of Ohio to be
exempt. The court did not undertake to reassess the validity of its earlier
holding. Both decisions, however, are difficult to reconcile with the wording
of Section 5709.02, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5328-1, Ohio General
Code) which excludes from taxation intangible property of " persons
residing in this state used in and arising out of business transacted outside
of this state. "5'
In the sole case involving the corporate franchise tax,52 the court held
that under applicable statutes5" the Tax Commissioner must accept as final
the taxpayer's reported book value of assets if its books are kept in accord-
ance with sound and generally recognized accounting principles. The Com-
missioner need not accept the book value of assets reflected in the taxpayer's
books, however, if there is evidence tending to prove that the accounts have
been falsified, " or that the asset values shown therein are not m fact
what they purport to be." Presumably, the Commissioner need not accept
the book values either if "sound and generally recognized" accounting prin-
ciples are not used. Thus the Commissioner has some weapons to show
the valuation is wrong, but the burden is on him. The majority's interpre-
tation of the Code sections may be justified by practical necessities, but it
comes close to the dissenters' position that the Commissioner is required
" to accept as final whatever figure the taxpayer may choose to offer."54
FRANKLIN C. LATCHAm
TORTS
Negligence
Special Relationships
a. Sellers
Whether wrong or wronged, used car dealers have often borne the brunt
of various supposed jokes. Now the Supreme Court of Ohio has cast a
"Under the tax on intangible property see also Reinhard v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 116,
111 N.E.2d 262 (1953) which held a sale by an executrix of securities belonging
to the estate was in the usual course of business of the executrix within Section
5711.01, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5366, Ohio General Code) and was therefore
not taxable.
12 National Tube Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 98, 111 N.E.2d 11 (1953)
"OHio REv. CODE § 5733.02, 5733.03, 5733.05 (OHio GEN. CODE §§ 5495-2,
5496, 5497, 5498).
" Dutt v. Marion Air Conditioning Sales, 159 Ohio St. 290, 112 N.E.2d 32 (1953)
involved the states lien for unpaid unemployment compensation tax. Undef Section
4141.23, Ohio Revised Code (Section 134 5-4 (a) (4), Ohio General Code) the
state has a lien on all real and personal property of the delinquent taxpayer. When
the state files a notice of lien in the office of the county recorder where the property
is located it was held the state has a prior lien to all mortgages filed thereafter.
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more serious eye on the situation and ruled that a used car dealer may be
held liable for injuries resulting from his sale of a defective used vehicle.
The case is Thrash v. U-Drtve-It Co.' Defendant used car dealer repre-
sented to Ronald Thrash's father that a certain truck was in good operating
condition. But, in fact, presumably without the dealer's knowledge, the
truck was equipped with a misfitted and insecure lock ring on the left front
wheel Ronald's father purchased and used the truck in his business, where
it was being used when the mishap occurred. The defective lock ring blew
-off, causing the tire also to come off. The truck crushed Ronald, a passenger,
as it rolled down an embankment. Ronald sued the dealer for his injuries,
mainly on the ground that the dealer had failed to make a proper inspec-
tion of the truck before sale. In the trial court, a verdict was instructed for
the dealer before any evidence was allowed. The supreme court upheld the
court of appeals reversal for new trial, by saying: "Although a dealer in
used motor vehicles is not an insurer of the safety of the vehicles he sells, he
is generally under a duty to exercise reasonable care in making an examina-
tion thereof to discover defects therein which would make them dangerous
to users or to those who might come in contact with them."2 The court
emphasized the significance of any accompanying representations by the
dealer of the vehicle's fitness for use.
Perhaps of more general application was the court's refusal to extend
liability to the U-Drive-It Co. which had sold the car to the dealer "as is."
Counsel for plaintiff apparently pressed the famous MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. case,3 but the court found no parallel in reason for an extension
of that case to these circumstances, " especially where he [seller to used
car dealer] makes no representations or warranties as to the condition of the
vehicles sold" and " had no dealings with plaintiff's father" and where
plaintiff's father had not relied on him in making the purchase.
b. Landowners
In Lampe v. Magoulakzs,6 defendant hired an independent -contractor
to paint a storeroom and persuaded him to use two of defendant's ladders for
the job. One of the ladders broke down in normal use, injuring plaintiff,
an employee of the contractor. The plaintiff received a verdict for his
'158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
'Id. at -422, 110 N.E.2d at 423.
3217 N.Y. 382, 111 "N.E. 1050 (1916). Justice Cardoza there expressed the opin-
ion of the court that manufacturers who negligently distribute defective automobiles
may be liable to ultimate purchasers who are injured as a result.
Thrash v. U-Drive-it Co., 158-Ohio St. 465, 471, 110 N.E.2d,419, 422 (1953)
" Imposing possible liability on the used car dealer was, of course, merely an exten-
sion of the Buick case.
o159 Ohio St. 72, 111 N.E.2d 7 (1953), notion for rehearing denied.
19541
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
injuries approved without opinion by the court of appeals but reversed by
the Supreme Court of Ohio. The latter court classified the plaintiff's posi-
tion as that of a licensee on the basis that the ladders were gramitiously
lent to the contractor. The loan had no connection with the contractual
relationship of the parties. Thus defendant had no duty to inspect the
ladders before making the loan.7
In Denison v. Buckeye Parking Corp.," the owner of a parking lot was
relieved of liability for injuries incident to a defective driveway abutting the
lot, even though the defects were the consequence of repeated use of the
driveway by persons going to and from the lot. In Wise v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co.,' the owner of a store parking lot was held not responsible
for the dangerous condition created by the natural accumulation of ice and
snow in the lot. Finally, it was held in Hay v. Norwalk Lodge No. 730,
B.P.O.E.1° that a landowner may be liable if a limb from his tree falls on a
highway traveler if the landowner should have been aware of the danger.1
c. Landlords
A landlord is not liable in tort for injuries resulting from defects in any
premises under the exclusive control of his tenants, even if the landlord
contracted to make all necessary repairs. In Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropoli-
tan Housing Authority 2 a right reserved by the landlord to enter his ten-
ant's premises when necessary to provide sufficient services did not take ex-
clusive control of the premises from the tenant, according to the Ohio
Supreme Court. In Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co.,13 a lower court was
confronted with a stairway which led down to a basement apartment, up to
second floor apartments and from there led only to plaintiff's premises.
Held: The plaintiff could not recover from the landlord for the plaintiff's
injuries in falling on accumulations of ice and snow on the upper portion
of the stairway, even if the landloard had agreed to keep the stairway clear.
'In Wellman v. East Ohio Gas Co., 160 Ohio St. 103, 113 N.E.2d 629 (1953), it
was held that a landowner is not responsible to an employee of an independent con-
tractor engaged on the landowner's premises for injuries arising out of the job from
a hazard known by the independent contractor: in this case from the high pressure
of trapped gas in pipes which the contractor was installing on the premises.
'94 Ohio App. 379, 115 N.E.2d 187 (1953)
'94 Ohio App. 320, 115 N.E.2d 33 (1952)
"92 Ohio App. 14, 109 N.E.2d 481 (1951)
"In Niebes v. Crestline Aerie No. 859, Fraternal Order of Eagles, 94 Ohio App. 21,
114 N.E.2d 260 (1952), a fraternal organization was held to owe no greater
duty to members of its ladies auxiliary, gratuitously using the premises, than it owed
to any gratuitous licensees. Involved was a defective stairway and a tumble for a
member of the auxiliary.
"160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d 869 (1953), motion for rehearing denied.
"63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109 N.E.2d 556 (App. 1952)
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With one judge dissenting, the court felt that the upper portion of the
stairway was in plaintiff's exclusive control."
d. Common Carriers
In Franck v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 5 the plaintiff had shipped some
healthy horses via the defendant express company. They were received at
their destination in an allegedly damaged condition. The lower court in-
structed the usual presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier. The
supreme court remanded for a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff had
sent his own agent along with the shipment. Therefore, said the court, the
plaintiff was in just as good a position as the defendant to know the reason
for the damages and did not need the benefit of a presumption. Other ship-
pers also lost the benefit of presumptions of negligence against carriers, one
because the deterioration of livestock was held to be due to their natural
propensities;' 0 the other because damage to shipped goods was discovered
by the consignee after he had transported the consigned goods from the
carrier to his own place of business.17
e. Host Drivers
Ohio Appellate Courts continued to wrestle with the now established
standard for wanton misconduct under the guest statute: "a disposition to
perversity." In Fessel v. Schwartz'8 the court did not believe that the de-
fendant driver had such a disposition at the time of the claimed injury, even
though he may have shown it earlier in failing to make proper stops at inter-
sections. In Mijak v. Boyle,19 the court held that a mere disposition to per-
versity is not enough without actual injury-causing conduct demonstrating
such a disposition. The plaintiff had proven only a peevish disregard by
the defendant driver of a request by the occupants of the car for the de-
fendant to exercise more caution.
In Hartman v. Wooley,10 the question whether plaintiff was a guest
within the terms of the guest statute was held to be one for the jury where
plaintiff only paid for the gas. The question was whether there was "a
"'A less debatable ground for the opinion might have been that a landlord is not
responsible for injuries arising out of natural accumulations of ice and snow. For a
recent opinion on this point, see Ross v. Heberling, 92 Ohio L Abs. 148, 109 N.E.2d
586 (App. 1952).
" 159 Ohio St. 343, 112 N.E.2d 381 (1953).
"Trees v. Penn. R.R., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 497, 109 N.E.2d 29 (App. 1951).
" Elder & Johnston Co. v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 358, 115
N.E.2d 179 (1953).
"94 Ohio App. 201, 114 N.E.2d 730 (1952).
112 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio App. 1952).
115 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio App. 1951).
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substantial tangible benefit conferred" upon the defendant driver as pay-
ment for the transportation.2 1
Evidence
In Hamilton v Cleveland,22 a company rule prohibiting bus drivers from
holding extended conversation with passengers was admitted as evidence of
defendant's negligence. The plaintiff was injured by the concussion from
the discharge of a policeman's pistol during a friendly conversation between
defendant's bus driver and the policeman aboard a bus. One can at least
wonder whether the company powers were thinking of any hazards but
those of the road when they framed the admitted rule.
Contributory Negligence
Of several cases involving suits against Cincinnati for injuries arising
from defective streets or sidewalks, one at least seems worthy of mention.
In Frmdman v. Cincinnati,2s the plaintiff walking to work on a sidewalk
abutting an allegedly heavily traveled street came to a broken slanting side-
walk. Instead of changing the hazards of the street or taking an alternate
roundabout means he continued on. He fell and injured himself. Assump-
tion of risk may be the holding, but the court noted that this is often called
contributory negligence. Take your choice.
-2 4
Assured Clear Distance Ahead
Two interesting fact situations are little more than cited. One involves
a plaintiff who in broad daylight ran into the shovel of a large caterpillar
ditcher extended over a highway.25 The appellate court held that the
question of plaintiffs due care was one for the jury. The other case in-
volved a plaintiff who on a foggy night allegedly swerved to avoid an
animal in the road and ran into defendant's trailer .2  The trailer was claimed
to be parked on the road unlighted and unguarded. The court held as a
matter of law for the defendant.
' Interesting from an analytical point of view is Melville v. Greyhound Corp., 94
Ohio App. 258, 115 N.E.2d 42 (1953) Plaintiff sued one defendant under the
guest statute for wanton misconduct together with another defendant for ordinary
negligence. The latter defendant claimed that he could not possibly have been the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury where the other contributing party was guilty of
wilful misconduct. The court held that such conduct was foreseeable and also that
concurring wrongdoers may be joined in one action. For an affirmance of the latter
principle, see Glass v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 115 N.E.2d 78
(1953).
93 Ohio App. 93, 110 N.E.2d 50 (1952)
:92 Ohio App. 160, 109 N.E.2d 520 (1952)
'See also Griffin v. Cincinnati, 92 Ohio App. 492, 111 N.E.2d 31 (1952)
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Res lpsa Loquitur
In Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble,27' the plaintiff purchased from a re-
tailer a bar of soap in the original package of defendant manufacturer. The
plaintiff was injured by a piece of wire imbedded in the soap. The court of
appeals held that from these facts the jury might find that the defendant had
had exclusive possession and control of the soap during manufacture and
that defendant had been negligent. Liberties with "exclusive control" were
also taken by another appellate court in Hudson v. Bennett.2 The defendant
owned and operated a motor vehicle auction lot containing autos consigned
to him for sale. It was defendant's practice to park cars in the lot, in gear,
brakes applied and the key in ignition. During a sale attended by many
prospective customers, one of the parked and driverless cars rolled down a
slanting driveway leading from the lot into the street where it collided with
plaintiff's auto. It seems that prospective purchasers were allowed to start
the motors of the various cars and even to drive them. Held: res ipsa loquitur
applies. Obviously somebody was negligent, said the court, and if it were
a customer, such action was apparently contemplated and should have been
prevented by defendant. Besides, the plaintiff could in no way explain or
"determine the specific cause of the collision." 9
False Imprisonment
In Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc.,30 the plaintiff had gone into the
defendant's store to purchase a can of fruit cocktail while waiting for a
streetcar. While standing in line to complete her purchase, she saw her
streetcar approaching; so she put down the fruit cocktail on the nearest
counter and prepared to leave. Her way was immediately blocked by a
clerk who expressed a desire to search her shopping bag. She resisted by
word, he persisted by word. She acquiesced, although no force nor threats
of force were used. The practice in this store was to check all bags for
' Schultz v. Meyerholtz, 91 Ohio App. 566, 109 N.E.2d 35 (1951). See also note,
5 WEST. RES. L. REv. 77 (1953).
-Bredenbeck v. Hollywood Cartage Co., Inc., 92 Ohio App. 265, 110 N.E.2d 152
(1952).
' 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953). The supreme court reversed in January of
this year: 160 Ohio St 489 (1954). For a full analysis see a later issue of this
review.
='94 Ohio App. 329, 115 N.E.2d 20 (1952).
"See also Sieling v. Mahrer, 113 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio App. 1953), where res ipsa
loquitur was held not applicable in aid of specific charges of negligence. But the
charges involved medical diagnosis and treatment ordinarily excluded from the scope
of the doctrine. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calland, 93 Ohio App. 543, 114
NXE.2d 162 (1952), where res ipsa loqtutur was applied in a suit involving an auto-
mobile collision.
' 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
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concealed goods belonging to the store. The plaintiff was an old customer.
Held: judgment for the plaintiff reversed and judgment entered for the
defendant. Such submission to mere verbal directions was not a false im-
prisonment, for there was no restraint against the will of the plaintiff, said
the court. Who can doubt, upon reflection, that the plaintiff must have felt
some restraint, but the court planted its decision in firmer soil by adding
that a customer who "apparently" has not paid for what he has received
may be detained for a reasonable period for the purpose of investigation.
Slander
According to the decision in DeAngelo v. W.T Grant Co.,3 a depart-
ment store manager may accuse an employee, in this case a sales girl, of
shortages in her account within the hearing of a passing employee without
liability for slander. The accusations were held qualifiedly privileged be-
cause arising in the course of the employer-employee relationship. Fur-
thermore, the statement was made in direct answer to a question put by the
accused employee.
Fraud
In Gusnan v. Peter,3 2 it was decided that a representation by an Ohio
vendor of a restaurant to an out of state buyer that a beer and wine license
was readily obtainable for a restaurant located in Ohio was not a statement
of opinion, but of fact. Thus the buyer might properly sue for fraud where
such statement was not true.33
Release
In Mainfort v. Giannestrar,3 4 it was held that a release by an injured party
to a physician who negligently caused the injury might serve to bar a suit by
the injured party against another physician who negligently aggravated the
original injury. It would depend, said the court, whether the first physician
might be liable for the aggravation under the doctrine of proximate causes
64 Ohio L. Abs. 366, 111 N.E.2d 773 (App. 1952).
113 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio App. 1953).
'See also Waters v. Novak, 115 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 1953), where the court
points out the distinction between implied malice and the actual malice necessary to
justify the recovery of exemplary damages in a suit for fraud.
"44 Ohio Op. 440, 111 N.E.2d 692 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1950).
Under this doctrine, where the negligence of a third person enters in, the party
responsible for the original negligence is also responsible for the subsequent negli-
gence if it is what is usually termed as "forseeable."
" 158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E.2d 855 (1952), motion for rehearing denied. See
CiVIL PROCEDURE in this issue and also 5 WEsT. RES. L REv. 109 (1953).
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